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## JACQUES LACAN AND THE OTHER SIDE OF PHILOSOPHY<sup>1</sup>

*Who can deny that **philosophy** has ever been anything other than a  
fascinating **enterprise** for the **master's benefit**?*

J. L.

### **Introduction**

*Lacan from the Other Side*

His era was absolutely the time of burgeoning minds in the continental Europe.

Literary world was shaken when Albert Camus won the Nobel for his taunting portrayal of human actions. In Russia, Boris Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago* dropped the bomb that tickles the pillars of Soviet Communism. Salvatore Quasimodo in Italy began the art of weaving words into a field of human poetry to versify "the tragic experience of his time".

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<sup>1</sup> This paper attempts to explore the teachings of the French psychoanalyst/philosopher Jacques Lacan particularly on three points: (1) theoretical development; (2) Theory on Four Discourses and; (3) his attitude on Philosophy based on the aforementioned theory. This paper, in general, tries to expose Lacan's thoughts on what constitute the Other Side of Philosophy, that is, its other face or what is philosophy for Lacan.

In art, Pablo Picasso's cubism reached its height until the *Head of a Woman* was drawn. At the same time, Salvador Dalí's *The Persistence of Memory* pressed Surrealism to its limit while Joan Miró's *Wall of the Moon* and *Wall of the Sun* defined Cubism with Fauvism.

European Film festivals were attended by celebrated directors such as the Japanese Akira Kurosawa, American Orson Welles and the Italian Vittorio de Sica.

The Scientific world, however, experienced its paradigm shift when Albert Einstein, through the Eddington's proof, overthrew the fixated Newtonian Mechanics by his General Theory of Relativity. On the other hand, mathematics spreads its influence on other fields through the American John Forbes Nash, Jr. whose works on Game Theory and Bargaining Problem challenged the hundred-year old Invisible Hand of Adam Smith and mashed Europe with new waves of theories in economics, evolutionary psychology and biology, rational behaviorism and other social sciences.

The European politics transformed the world into an arena where the Englishman Churchill battled the German Hitler to end the insanity of the Totalitarian Dream.

Amidst of the war that conflagrated in all continents, it was also an era of dire need for philosophy to restore the culture of thinking.

In France, Jean-Paul Sartre published his magnum opus *Being and Nothingness*; but on the other side of the region, Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* had been the foci of philosophizing in German Universities since Hegel where phenomenology finds its home meanwhile Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hannah Arendt are university students where the former revived a phenomenological way to interpret texts called Hermeneutics through his oeuvre *Truth and Method* while the latter became a political icon with the publication of *The Human Conditions*. The Institute for Social Research in Germany developed the thought of the Frankfurt School led by critical theorists such as Adorno and Horkheimer. Also, Kierkegaard's late blooming works posthumously found its great philosophical import during the war, especially in solving the problem of Man's existence from the daybreak; while his contemporaries such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Karl Jaspers continued the legacy of existentialism.

Meanwhile in Vienna, Psychoanalysis never saw its twilight when its enemies were rejoicing in the streets of Europe not only because of the death of God, but might as well as the death of a certain Sigmund Freud and his break with the mystic Carl Jung who were actually the bringers of the great plague.

Moreover, the Analytic movement finds its vanguard through Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred Jules Ayer and the rest of their Viennese friends.

There was also a revival of German Idealism through the efforts of Alexander Kojève,<sup>2</sup> the man whom we have a great debt because of his seminars in Hegel that inspired the youth of many philosophers, linguists and anthropologists including the French Psychoanalyst *Jacques Emilé Lacan*.

*Who was Lacan?*

He whom the very theater of psychoanalytic society lighted up with his audiences jammed a 650-seater hall into an 850-seater, delivered his lecture for almost thirty years, without fail, (ranging from various topics like clinical psychiatry, philosophy and politics in every second and fourth Wednesday of the month) from different institutions in Paris and around the world. His seminars were attended by several theoreticians and thinkers such as Alain Badiou, Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser.

No doubt, his friends were: the novelist Georges Bataille, philosopher Martin Heidegger, surrealist Salvador Dáali, linguist Roman Jakobson, the Hegelian Jean Hyppolite and anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss. He also became the personal physician of the surreal painter, Pablo Picasso.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See Alexander Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Spirit*, ed. Alan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1980); Kojève gave seminars attended by various scholars, doctors and philosophers such as Lacan, Blanchot to name a few. Lacan even recognized Kojève as his "master": "'Kojève', whom I hold to be my master for having introduced me Hegel" [See Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, *Lacan Absolute Master*, trans. Douglas Brick (California: Standford University Press, 1991)]. Because of Kojève's influence to Lacan, the latter's conception of the former is not originally Hegel but Kojève's Hegelianism.

<sup>3</sup> Sean Homer, *Jacques Lacan* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 5.

With this network and environment, one ought to ask: what is the relationship of Lacan to these people? There are two answers: it is either Lacan read them or they have read Lacan.

He was known for his puns, jokes and sometimes lectures that are often misinterpreted in lieu of his arrogance and master-like attitude. He wears Mao collared shirts, with bow ties and often smoked with his twisted cigars. His teachings, as he often described, *is not in a form of a pill*<sup>4</sup> in which one has to drink in order to get best results. It's true. Lacan often speak for two hours without interruptions normally it ends with confusion, misinterpretation and puzzlement to his students. He used complicated words and more often than not plays with syllables that result to the creation of new words (neologism) like *jouissance*, *objet petit a*, and *alethosphere*. His books were published in a form of lecture as if he is speaking in front of you, from dictions to circuitous expositions. He was right indeed; *it is not akin to a pill*.

There were two pictures of Lacan: the young and the old.

Jacques Lacan was born in Paris on April 15, 1901. He grew in a comfortable middle-class Catholic family and attended College Stanislas, a well-known school run by Jesuits. He excelled in religious studies and philosophy and developed a lifelong passion for philosophy particularly on atheism of Baruch Spinoza. It led him to the extent of hanging a poster of Spinoza's newly published *Ethics* in his school dormitory that marked his opposition to upbringing as a Catholic.<sup>5</sup>

After leaving early school, he began his study on medicine particularly in psychiatry where he specialized in the study of Psychosis. In 1932, he received his doctorate in psychiatry with a dissertation on Paranoia.<sup>6</sup> In 1930's, He began reading Freud and Salvador Dali. This started his intellectual relationship with the Surrealist movement led by Dali and Breton and published article in Surrealist-journal *Minotaure*. In 1934, because of the outgrowing influence of Freudian Psychoanalysis in literature and philosophy but a rejection in Parisian life, Lacan entered analysis under the tutelage of Rudolph Loewenstein and became an active member of the *Societe Psychanalytique de Paris* (SPP).

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<sup>4</sup> Jacques Lacan, *My Teaching*, trans. David Macey (London/New York: Verso, 2008), 12.

<sup>5</sup> Homer, *Jacques Lacan*, 3-4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

Lacan's intellectual development can be summarized into three phases: the Imaginary, Symbolic and the Real.<sup>7</sup> In the first period (1932-1948), Lacan formulated the Mirror Phase: his intended break from the formal psychoanalytic tradition out of his re-reading of Freud that resulted to his formulation of narcissism and its corresponding origin, the specular ego. In 1936, he read a paper to the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) which remained unpublished until today.<sup>8</sup> After 13 years, Lacan delivered again a paper that embraced the Imaginary phase of his teaching,

The mirror stage is a drama whose inner dynamic moves rapidly from insufficiency to anticipation—and which, for the subject caught in the snares of spatial identification, fashions the series of fantasies that runs from the image of a fragmented body to what we may call the orthopedic vision of its totality—and to the armor, donned at last, of an alienating identity, whose rigid structure will shape all the subject's future mental development.<sup>9</sup>

“Fragmented body” is the child's body that is being developed in lieu of his desire to fulfill its lack as an unfulfilled body, meaning, a depiction of his inability to stand all by himself. The child needs someone to act as an Ideal-Ego—the Other to which he will realize the “orthopedic vision of reality”, in other words, the individual that will provide guidance in order for the child to be capable in standing-up (*ortho-* which means upright) with his own feet. This *Other* is the mother whose ego is “alienates” the child's identity. The child then

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<sup>7</sup> See Jacques Lacan, *RSI*, trans. Cormac Gallagher; available at <http://lacanireland.com> (unpublished). Published lately in the French edition of *Autrés Ecrits*. The English translation of this text is not yet available but some seminars included in this book are already translated in English.

<sup>8</sup> But the edited version of this paper entitled “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” appeared in Lacan's magnum opus, *Ecrits* [See Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2002), 75]. It was delivered on July 17, 1949 in Zurich at 16<sup>th</sup> International Congress of Psychoanalysis. The original paper was remained unpublished after the Congress and IPA Chair Ernest Jones halted Lacan's speech. Suspicion arrives that his lecture is controversial because of its attacks on the formation of the ego. Chiefly, his break from Freud's auxiliaries arose controversy that initiated his expulsion to the IPA. On the next morning, Lacan leaved the Congress to watch the Berlin Olympics.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 78.

mirrors/reflects the “*imago*” of the mother as if it is his own ego. This is the formation of the child’s *specular ego*. Like that of Freud, Lacan prophesied the same complexity of Oedipusian oracle: *slaying the father and sleeping with the mother* where the phrase “sleeping with the mother” is akin to the notion of the Ideal-Ego. The child will identify himself, and thus alienated with the mother, his reflection and image. First form of desire connects the child and the mother. Thus, the mother becomes the first object of desire of the child, his primary *objet petit a*. The Imaginary has now a position in Lacan’s thought.

However, this attitude didn’t last long. After a decade, Lacan shifted from Imaginary phase into Symbolic stage brought by the sudden shift of desire from mother to the father. The Father (or in Lacanese terms In-the-Name-of-the-Father) acts as the Phallus to which he intervenes to the imaginary relation of the child-mother via the *symbolic castration* thwarted to the relationship. He *separates* the two individuals by imposing laws; empty laws (it is just a mere name) by which they obey because the Father is a phallic signifier of power, the phallogocentric view that Lacan advocated from the family up to the society. The desire then shifts from Mother to the Father, and the child eventually lost his first *objet petit a* (small object/object of desire) and now ready to identify himself with his new object—the Law of the Father. The child is now subjected to this Law and becomes a divided subject, a split of desire brought by constituted anxiety of the Loss.<sup>10</sup> He will find a substitute to his Mother’s love out of this anxious position in the image of an Other (e.g. friends, partners and *etcetera*). The child learns now how to speak and express his side through signs and symbols. That is why from being a *fragmented body* that exudes into a complete yet alienated ego, he transforms into a speaking subject (*parle-etre*) that participates in the speech

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<sup>10</sup> See Slavoj Žižek, “*Objet a* in Social Links,” in *Reflections on Seminar XVII: Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, eds. Justin Clemens and Russell Grigg (United States: Duke University Press, 2006). Jacques-Alain Miller wrote a distinctive notion between constituted anxiety versus constituent anxiety. This constituted anxiety constitutes *lost object-cause of desire*, meaning, an object is put into fantasy (or the *objet a* overlaps the Loss) by the subject and he “confines himself to fantasy” (116) because of the constituted lack (or the belief that the object is lost originally) that makes the subject himself *desire* for it. On the other hand, in constituent anxiety, the *loss* itself is the object consequently the subject is being *driven* to seek for this *loss* circuitously. This distinction is best described by their *fantasmic* and *postfantasmic* conditions of the object and the level of awareness that the subject whenever he encounter the *objet a* either as the lost-object or the object-loss itself (117). (See also Žižek, *The Parallax View* [Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2006]).

community of the socio-symbolic order.<sup>11</sup> By learning to express himself, he is now veering away from his mother thus separating himself with the image of the mother. In symbolic stage, Lacan put primacy to signifier<sup>12</sup> in which he wrote as:

$$\frac{\text{Signifier}}{\text{Signified}}$$

to which the signifier (S) means the letters, or symbols that represents other signifier in a signification chain. Signified (s) is concept of thought that which operates beneath the signifier. This means that all concepts are summarized into one signifier only, especially by way of metaphor that put all things under one character, including thought. Apparently, the signifier represents another signifier in the chain, a signification process that constantly produces knowledge anchored in language via representation of signifiers (S->S->S->S) until what Lacan dubbed as the quilting point or the *point de capiton*. Nonetheless the child grows and learns to speak (thru significations of signs and symbols) but he cannot elude from the traumatic situation of castration by the father as what extrapolated in Oedipus complex. *The desire of the Other shall return*. This trauma is the Real, the third phase of Lacan whose nature is murky and controversial.

The Real is a crucial concept that vicissitudes its meaning to his entire theoretical development. The Real once attained the status of Hegelese *Absolute Thing* in his *Ethics of Psychoanalysis*.<sup>13</sup> It is all about the unspoken, the unconscious where our subjectivity follows.<sup>14</sup> In one's journey, he is pushed-to-the-Real, meaning, one is brought in the light of the *limit*, of *death drive* in Freudian context, in a certain *Jouissance* in the old Lacanese lexicon. This *Jouissance* is the sister of Truth, the coming-to-be and yet one is unaware of or to be more exact: unconscious of.

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<sup>11</sup> Jacques Alain Miller, "Mathemes," in *Lacan: Topologically Speaking* eds. Ellie Ragland and Dragan Milanovic (New York: Other Press, 2004), 29.

<sup>12</sup> As contrast to Saussure s/S. See Jacques Lacan, "The Function and Field of Language in Psychoanalysis," in *Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 167.

<sup>13</sup> See Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book VII: Ethics of Psychoanalysis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1992).

<sup>14</sup> As what the famous Freudian formula says, *Wo es war, soll Ich warden* in which Lacan made his famous translation as "Where I was, there I shall come into being."

Then the Real is the pivotal point of Lacanian Theory. However, with this kind of description, Lacan denied the allegation that his Real is equipollent to the *Noumenon* which is the unknown in the Kantian Metaphysics.<sup>15</sup> In this period, Lacan recognized the unconscious as the groundwork of the Real in which it can never symbolize or interpret. *It is a discourse without a speech.*<sup>16</sup> And most likely for him, the Real is “distinguished (...) by the fact of its economy (...) admits something new, which is precisely the impossible.”<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, Real says Lacan, is also responsible for human actions. As what stated earlier, it is a traumatic phenomenon that intervenes to the signification process, thus resulting to dividing or splitting of the subject<sup>18</sup> (The first one was when the Father threatened the child with castration).

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<sup>15</sup> Or the expulsion of the Real to the symbolic much as the *Verwerfung* (foreclosure) and *Ausstossung* of the symbolic to the Real, that is, the return to the Real (See Lacan, “Response to Jean Hypollite’s Commentary on Freud’s *Vereinung*,” in *Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English* [New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2002], 308-317). Moreover, Lacan said: *una nozione ontologica, metafisica del reale* (It [Real] is not at all ontological). This is a strong conviction from Lacan following his declaration that he is not a philosopher at all. This marked Lacan as an antiphilosopher. This paper aims to expose Lacan’s attitude against Philosophy as he bereft philosophic tradition in light of the Master discourse. Jacques Lacan, “Le Triomphe de la Religion,” *Le triomphe de la religion, précède de Discours aux catholiques*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2005) 96. It is quoted and translated by Adrian Johnston, “Philosophy Which is not One: Jean-Claude Milner, Alain Badiou, and Lacanian Antiphilosophy,” in *Journal of the Jan Van Eyck Circle for Lacanian Ideology Critique* 3 (2010), 140.

<sup>16</sup> See Jacques Lacan, *The Seminars of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Jacques Alain-Miller; trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007). That is why Lacan believed that there is even not a metalanguage that can describe the Real. Lacan, the latter one, then stressed the importance of Mathematics in explaining the Real through what he called “mathemes.” (Jacques-Alain Miller, “Mathemes: Topology in the Teaching of Lacan,” in *Lacan Topologically Speaking* eds. Ellie Ragland and Dragan Milovanovic [New York: Other Press, 2004]). Lacan, then, declared the aim of Psychoanalysis, that is, mathematical formalization expressed in the attempt to mathematize the Real (See Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink [New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1998]).

<sup>17</sup> Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 167.

<sup>18</sup> By subject’s division, Lacan wanted to express the hysterical condition of man. This splitting (*Spaltung*), was brought by man’s quest to interpret his condition, his desire to fulfill his lack-ness within. Dreams, jokes, puns and slips of the tongue are signs of the Real. Lacanian Psychoanalysis is not a discourse to cure this hysteria. Otherwise, it aims to confront the subject with the corresponding Real so as to help the latter realize his fears and anxiety. The analyst then is the subject-who-supposed-to-know in a session, meaning the he characterizes himself as

The Real stage inaugurates the later Lacan. This project begun from *Seminar XX*<sup>19</sup> or famously dubbed as the *Encore* until his unpublished seminars on *Caracas*. He began formulations that best described the Real (other than what his exposition in the *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*) in terms of the fourth order other than the RSI<sup>20</sup> which he called the *sinthome*.<sup>21</sup>

His School *Ecolé Freudienne de Paris* in 1980 was dissolved by Lacan himself and he pronounced to his followers if they want still to follow him, they should write a letter for their interest.<sup>22</sup> Weeks after weeks, thousands of letters all over the world reached the old psychoanalyst—eager minds whose desires are wheeled towards the Lacanian legacy.

Jacques Derrida, by that time, commenced the project of Deconstruction while he was teaching at ENS and also abroad. Gilles Deleuze finally met Felix Guattari and their partnership set their ambitious project of ousting the Lacanian Legacy through the publication of *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. The French Philosopher Alain Badiou is making a name on philosophic community after his break with Louis Althusser on the aftermath of May 68' events which he actually described as the "red years." The young Žižek went to France in hopes of meeting and become a trainee of Lacan but the latter died the year when the former arrived. Moreover, Michel Foucault was in the spot light of philosophic

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dummy knower of the Real for the sake of the transference. Analysts locate the Real through its manifestation, the symptom.

<sup>19</sup> Indicated in Jacques Lacan, *The Seminars of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore, 1972-1973*, ed. Jacques Alain-Miller; trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998).

<sup>20</sup> Real, Symbolic, Imaginary.

<sup>21</sup> Appeared in Ellie Ragland, "Introduction," in *Lacan: Topologically Speaking*, xxv; see also Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 2009): Žižek further characterized *sinthome* with respect to Lacan as the unity between symptom and fantasy. For him, "interpretation of symptoms is going through fantasy" (80). That is why, if one will contextualize the reading of Žižek to Lacan, the famous Lacanian quotation "enjoy your symptom!" is justified in terms of living one's own life, enjoying each and every one's symptoms for that's the only way we can live until the *jouissanic* fortune of each one of us.

<sup>22</sup> See Jacques Lacan, "Letter of Dissolution," in *Television/A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, ed. Joan Copjec (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), 129-131.

present, from his monicker as a *noveoux philosophe*. The ideology of the student movement ceased for the preparation of the new era to come.

Be that as it may, the year after the dissolution of his School and when the time of revolutionary philosophizing in Europe was on its tracks, the French newspaper *Libération* released shocking news that concerned Lacan's students and disciples: *Tout Fou Lacan* (Total Madness Lacan).

"The French Philosopher Jacques Lacan died," says the newspaper.

(But his discourse will never be).

## The Attempt of the Discourse

### *Social Bonding*

What is a social bond?

Ultimately, there is something in language that holds humans together. This 'something' fixes, crystallizes and uses resources of language that acts as a performativity bond among beings in which according to Lacan resulted to the creation of a '*speaking being*.'<sup>23</sup> It is only in language that there is being. The very entity of speaking makes him a being; in light of a structure which language reposes whenever one communicates to the rest of the group forming a larger structure of actors and speakers in a form of a discourse. This 'something' thus speaks: according to Lacan himself, this 'something' is discourse and thus it is a kind of social bond.

Lacan's Discourse Theory differs from several angles so as to compare with Habermasian Communicative Theory and Foucauldian discourse of biopolitics. He maintained the position on the context of an ongoing social revolution of his time chiefly the events of the 68' student uprising—it's pre- and post- scenes. What happened is that Lacan characterized the necessities of social

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<sup>23</sup> Quoted from the rare documentary that was shot during Lacan's lecture at the Catholic University of Louvain in Paris, France on October, 13, 1973. See Francois Wolff, prod., *Jacques Lacan Speaks*, 59 mins., 39 secs. (France: RTBF de la Communauté Francaise, 1982); It often appears too in Lacan's texts particularly in *Ecrits* where it was originally in French as *par l'etre*.

bond in which language is the key concept in gaining the said network. Human relationship therefore is founded on language and rest assured that this connection is being determined in various contexts in a discourse which we will be dealing later.

Speaking of human relationship, it is inevitable to go against the flow of time, apropos going back to nineteenth century—where Idealism is at its height framed to the problem of consciousness where the Master and the Slave is at battle to whose consciousness shall win the favor of the *Absolute*.

Man is self-conscious. The moment he say “I,” he is conscious of his existence, what comes after is a long tragic story. Self-consciousness strikes back in human dignity—the helm of being recognized as Human and differs from other animals which makes up the premise of extending human dignity into reality.

The German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel holds that human dignity is based on the power of recognition.<sup>24</sup> Exceptionally, Man can recognize himself as man but all the more of this recognition is the necessity of the “other” to recognize him for such and this would call for a Desire to be recognized. Desire moves along with a certain “negation”<sup>25</sup> of a thing; simply put, a destruction to transform an object of his desire for his personal consumption e.g. in order to have pork in our dinner table, one has to kill a pig and transform it into a desirable object that satisfies our hunger and so on. The negation of the pig is likewise turning out the human dignity of the self against the humane status of the other, that is, “Desire in destroying, transforming, and assimilating the desired non-I.”<sup>26</sup> Desire is the Desire of the other, in a way, signified not as a body but the Desire taken as other in pursuit of love or recognition. The fractal reality is that: Desire is a representation of value whereby one needs to recognize his worth and from that note, one shall be a human. Subsequently, the premise that life is an endless battle of desire in order to be recognized by the other so as to impose the individual’s supreme value to other beings but not on the point of inflicting death. Human reality is constituted as a fight for recognition to the point that he even risks himself. To live in a small

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<sup>24</sup> Madan Sarup, *Jacques Lacan* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 32.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Sarup, *Jacques Lacan*, 32.

world, one must enslave the other, but not to the point of killing latter because if he does, no one will be left to praise him as the victor.<sup>27</sup> Hegel called this human as the Master. This desire of the Master was later called by Lacan as philosophy.<sup>28</sup>

The Master is not alone in considering himself as the Master. His nature of power, wealth and freedom would be non-efficacious without the praise of another speaking being<sup>29</sup> whose function is to be signified and undermined at any circumstance by a signifier (in this case, a Master,  $S_1/\$$  in the Lacanese matheme). The said signified is a Slave ( $\$$ )<sup>30</sup> in the classical Hegelian context. The Master reduces the slave from a subject into an object as a means of instrumentality at any forms like labor-induced production. The Master apparently, “can shuffle all the burdens onto the slave's shoulders and abandon himself to pleasure, while the work, pertaining to the slave, is based on the renunciation of enjoyment, and hence *Bildung*, the formation of outer and inner nature.”<sup>31</sup>

Moreover, that status of the Master is fixed. He is unable to progress because he is already in the apex of human civilization. The only thing he can do is to enjoy his wealth and power, and coerce the slave to work. However, the slave is the only capable being to transcend by negating his current state.<sup>32</sup> Hereafter, the future is solely reserved for the Slave. Thence, the Slave is fighting for a Desire to be recognized, a Desire to create an objective condition that permits him to opine his liberation from the fear of the Master’s will—the fear of

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>28</sup> Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 20.

<sup>29</sup> That is, he is being recognized by the other whom he recognized in return as worthy of recognizing him. See Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, He further quoted:

“I call this slave  $S_2$ , but you can also identify him here with the term '*jouissance*,' which, first, he didn't want to renounce, and second, he did indeed want to, since he substitutes work for it, which is not at all its equivalent" (198); [italics mine]

<sup>31</sup> Mladen Dolar, “Hegel and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis,” in *Reflections on Seminar XVII: Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis* eds. Russell Grigg and Justin Clemens (London: Duke University Press, 2006), 132.

<sup>32</sup> Sarup, *Jacques Lacan*, 33.

death imposed as a punishment. This is the autonomy that the Slave should primarily fight equaled to the downfall of the Master. Hereafter, as Kojève writes, “the future and History belong not to the warlike Master...but to the working of the Slave.”<sup>33</sup>

Therefore, social bond carries to the desire to be recognized.

*The Structure of the Discourse*

How to construct a discourse?

There were four structures that Lacan formulated that can be found in his political *Seminar XVII* entitled *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Master, Hysteric, Analyst and the University*.<sup>34</sup>

Each discourse represents a particular social bond. Insofar, he used structures to interpolate each bonding. (That is why the debate whether Lacan is a structuralist or not shall put to an end). More exactly, he used letters to delineate fundamental structure in a specific social relation. The four discourses are given in a form of “mathemes” which, as Jean-Claude Milner puts it, are “atoms of knowledge”; that is, they are entirely transmissible without loss.<sup>35</sup>

Lacan structured four chambers in each discourse that consists of mathemes that are essential to the function of each discourse namely: the Agent, Work, Truth and the Product. It is necessary to show, at least, the positions that these mathemes occupy in the structure:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{Agent} & \longrightarrow & \text{Other} \\ \hline \text{Truth} & & \text{Product} \end{array}$$

The *Agent*, says Lacan, is not at all necessarily someone who does but someone who is causing the act. The agent occupies the master-signifier position, the terminal in which supremacy, control and manipulation is performative. Each discourse starts with somebody talking. The *Agent* is the one who talks. If

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<sup>33</sup> Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 23.

<sup>34</sup> See Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*.

<sup>35</sup> Justin Clemens & Russell Grigg, “Introduction,” in *Reflections on Seminar XVII: Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis* eds. Russell Grigg and Justin Clemens (London: Duke University Press, 2006), 2.

one talks, he is talking to somebody, and that is the second position called the *Other* or *Work*.<sup>36</sup> The *Other* signifies the slave or the other in which the master puts into *work* to produce objects which the master uses in order to gain pleasure. "The master", says Lacan, "gives a sign and everybody jumps."<sup>37</sup> As a result, a certain *Product* is being manufactured underneath *Other*. Lacan called this product as Entropy.<sup>38</sup>

However, the *Product* is not what the *Truth* of the *Agent* expects found in the lower left chamber of the structure. Truth signifies the unconscious in which one is being driven to perform the discourse. Since Truth is a Thing which speaks yet not known (or we are unconscious of its talking), it is always misinterpreted by the Agent. The Agent always pursue that he creates the Truth, but in fact, the Truth is the one speaking yet we are unconscious of. The Truth is nothing but the *undead*<sup>39</sup> whose power is far more imaginative than realizable.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Lacan, recounted to use Work in his book rather than Other. But the researcher prefers the usage of Other.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 174

<sup>38</sup> Entropy has something to do with a loss get from the production. This entropic loss is being regulated by the master in order to be used in future run of production. Thus, it is also being characterized in terms of "excess" like heat when work is done according to law of thermodynamics. Entropy is the very limitation of *Jouissance*, the *objet a* of production. See Ibid., 48.

<sup>39</sup> Undead or *Lamella* for an instance according to Žižek. See Slavoj Žižek, *How to Read Lacan* (New York: Granta Books, 2006).

<sup>40</sup> The Thing is something that we seek and took for granted its appearance as the real thing that can satisfy our necessities (or lack). As Freud said through Lacan that the Truth speaks in the first dead-person point of view:

"To you I am thus the enigma of she who slips away as soon as she appears, you men who try so hard to hide me under the tawdry finery of your proprieties. Still, I admit your embarrassment is sincere, for even when you take it upon yourselves to become my heralds, you acquire no greater worth by wearing my colors than your own clothes, which are like you, phantoms that you are. Where am I going, having passed into you? And where was I prior to that? Will I perhaps tell you someday? But so that you will find me where I am, I will teach you by what sign you can recognize me. Men, listen, I am telling you the secret. I, truth, speak."

The Thing speaks like a prosopopeia speaker in most novels. The dead is speaking like a living entity however only exists to the imagination of the living subjects, only in imagination where the subject fantasizes the Thing to be in possession albeit no one can take a hold of it or

The relation of the *Truth* to *Product* is “impotence”<sup>41</sup>, meaning, what the *Truth* demands in not what the *Product* has to offer in reality (since truth resists symbolization, thus there is no way for it to appear or to be an object that is graspable). On the other hand, the relation between *Agent* and the *Other* is always subject to misunderstanding that is why one cannot escape the “function and field of language.” This is what Lacan called “impossibility.”<sup>42</sup>

Thusly, *impossibility* establishes the relationship of the Agent and the Work, while *impotence* that of Truth and the Product. The discourse structure, hereafter, is a manifestation that all human actions are intended for a certain loss, that is, a rejection of truth and more importantly results to misunderstanding—that *we cannot really escape language*.

### *Theory of Four Discourses*

Filling up those chambers, what can we formulate then? For Lacan, there are four possible patterns of discourse that can be established:

MASTER	HYSTERIC	ANALYST	UNIVERSITY
$\frac{S_1 \rightarrow S_2}{\$ \quad a}$	$\frac{\$ \rightarrow S_1}{a \quad S_2}$	$\frac{a \rightarrow \$}{S_2 \quad S_1}$	$\frac{S_2 \rightarrow a}{S_1 \quad \$}$

Lacan devised four mathemes that derives various combinations defines specific social function of the discourses:<sup>43</sup>

**S<sub>1</sub> Master Signifier**  
**S<sub>2</sub> Knowledge**

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even recognize it for the Thing will reveal itself to us without our permission. See Jacques Lacan, “The Freudian Thing or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis,” in *Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2006), 334.

<sup>41</sup> Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 174; see also Paul Verhaeghe, “From Impossibility to Inability: Lacan’s Theory on the Four Discourses” in *The Letter, Lacanian Perspectives on Psychoanalysis* 3 (Spring 1995), 91-108.

<sup>42</sup> Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 175.

<sup>43</sup> Clemens, *Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 3

**\$ Barred Subject**  
*a Objet petit a*

The Master signifier ( $S_1$ ) is in the agent position to depict the classical Hegelian Master. He gives a “false sign” ( $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$ ) in which everybody hopes to possess. That is why one *works* in order to get and take a grasp of it in terms of labor wages imposed by the Master in the long run. The Knowledge ( $S_2$ ) has something to do with the techniques of craftsmen that are vital in the mode of production. Normally, knowledge is in the possession of the slave.<sup>44</sup> A barred subject (\$) is a subject who desires for the Other for he does not possess the truth and knowledge and only assumes the possession of it whenever the slave works in order to produce an object (through the Master’s design) that might fulfill this ontological lack. It is barred, meaning it is divided, split and contains a lack.<sup>45</sup> Lastly, the object *a* (*a*) is the object of impossibility—the loss, the excess, the *Jouissance*—the limit that pushes one into the realm of desiring. *Jouissance* is fundamentally linked with excess.<sup>46</sup> This excess refers to a pure expenditure which serves no purpose and is of a negative order, an excess of sexuality and death which Freud and Lacan increasingly addressed as they encountered it in their work. It is only being produced in order for the Master to acquire wealth, property and power. It is only in the mode of fantasy and fetishism (e.g. *work*) that can fulfill the lack temporarily.

However, each social bond displays varying positions of these four terms. Please refer to the structures above in order to localize the said positions.

The Master controls the production. He produces the impossible object by forcing the slave to work ( $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$ ). However, his actions were spoken by none other than his desire to grasp the *objet petit a* ( $S_1 \rightarrow S_2/a$ ). The Master is the center of the discourse. He who controls the production, controls the life of the slaves namely by dominating in different fields in society not only in economic, political but also in philosophical meadow. However what pursues him to do such function is none other than the desire to fill his own lack of mastery thus the

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<sup>44</sup> Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 21-22.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>46</sup> Carmela Levy-Strokes, “*Jouissance*” in *Compendium of Lacanian Terms*, eds. Huguette Glowinski, Zita M. Marks and Sara Murphy (London: First Association Books, 2001), 101. As contrary to *jouis-sens*, a separate notion of pleasure which means “bodily pleasure” that can be found on the Borromean knot where the Imaginary and the Symbolic overlaps.

Truth position is a barred subject underneath the Agent ( $S_1/\$$ ) where Truth of the Master's identity is none other than a speaking subject ( $\$$ ) in disguise.

The Hysteric desires mastery to which he submits himself as a barred subject of the discourse ( $\$ \rightarrow S_1$ ). He believes that underneath the Master agent is the knowledge that in order to possess it, he must work ( $S_1/S_2$ ). However, in Truth, he produces the knowledge in form of *objet petit a* ( $\$/a$ ) in which a desirous attempt of a "missing object." The Hysteric also is the counter-discourse of the Master.

The Analyst discourse is more interesting. He analyzes, governs and educate the Hysteric in terms of being a *subject-who-knows* the *objet a* ( $a \rightarrow \$$ ). He represents the *objet petit a* of the hysteric. In short, the hysteric needs the analyst in order to cure his own symptoms such that the latter plays the role of localizing the *voice* and gaze of the *Other* that lingers in the unconscious wishes and desire of the former. His function is to cure the analysand with the truth in mind<sup>47</sup>, that is, the portrayal that he possesses the knowledge that the hysteric desires. However, by dominating the social relation, he ought to produce another Master ( $\$/S_1$ ), the continuing chain of production.<sup>48</sup>

Last but not the least is the most controversial structure that Lacan created as his reaction on the May 68' student revolt, the University Discourse. In here, Lacan cited the knowledge as agent that verbalize the *objet petit a* by incorporating it with capitalism in the school curriculum ( $S_2 \rightarrow a$ ). Underneath knowledge is the Master that regulates and manipulate the University to

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<sup>47</sup> Basically the assumption that he knows the truth by being a *subject- supposed-to-know*

<sup>48</sup> That is why Lacan's solution is refutable in a sense that if Psychoanalysis (because for a long time, it works outside this institution and mainly appears in a form of clinical operation) will be introduced in universities, it will cure the analysand's desire to fulfill the lack and fetishism of the object-loss (namely, student's desire for "Units of Credit" that is equivalent to involvement in the Capitalistic mode of production. But on the contrary, what happens is that the psychoanalytic discourse only produces another form of Mastery. See Jacques Lacan, "Impromptu at Vincennes," in *Television/A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, ed. Joan Copjec (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990). To quote Lacan,

You are the products of the University and you prove that you are surplus value, if only in this: what you not only consent to but actually applaud — and I don't see why I would object to it — is that you yourselves emerge from it, equal to more or less credits [*unites de valeur*]. You come here to turn yourselves into units of credit: you leave here stamped "Units of Credit" (121).

conform to its pursuits ( $S_2/S_1$ ). The products of the discourse are hysterical subjects who desire for the impossibility ( $a$ ) (namely Master's products) like students, and professors (\$).

In this study, one can trace all the roots of the problem to the Master as the dominant position in the structure. Hence, it is inevitable to trace the production of the Master Discourse—mainly in its repetitive stage of producing a loss; why Philosophy became the method of the Master through the University; and why we should call for the negation of such attitudes of philosophy other than the promise of psychoanalysis.

Had it not been on the Master as the agent that starts the discourse and yet end the structure at the dust of the day? Thusly, there lies the importance of the master signifier in the discourse theory that begets and traces the roots of the problem: why one dominates, and why one is being enslaved? Another thing, what is in the Master that he is able to commit such blunders in the bond? Is he really the master that able to produce the “impossible” out of “impotence?”

The next section will be Lacan's turn to wrap the deck.

## **The Other Side of Philosophy: The Master Discourse**

### *Philosophy and the Master Discourse*

Truth can only be said into halves.<sup>49</sup>

In light of the philosophic tradition, Truth can be understood in several ways, to the extent that one school claims or overlaps the other. One good example is the claim of psychoanalysis that Truth is *extimate*,<sup>50</sup> meaning a thing

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<sup>49</sup> *Mi dire la verité*. Ibid., 36.

<sup>50</sup> Regarding the extimacy of Truth as the *Objet Petit a*, the structure of internal exclusion is visible in the Lacan's attempt to construct the Topology of Jouissance namely an attempt to replace “in-” in “intimacy” by “ex-” resulting to “extimacy”. This extimate relation of subject and object (such as truth) includes the primal repression of things when explaining obsessive neurosis. For example, Science has been seeking the object-Truth or the Thing which is some-

that is included in itself and yet excluded in appearance. For Lacan, the Master is one with philosophy in exemplifying this kind of attitude,

It is clear that he [Master] is hidden from him, and a certain Hegel stated that it is delivered to him by the work of the slave. There you have it; however, it is a master's discourse, this discourse of Hegel's, which relies on substituting state for the Master via the long pathway of culture, culminating in absolute knowledge.<sup>51</sup>

To understand more,

$$\frac{S_1}{\$} \rightarrow \frac{S_2}{a}$$

The Master ( $S_1$ ) transforms the work of the slave ( $S_2$ ) in order to produce the Thing ( $a$ ) that will be his property via the pathway of the Slave's knowledge. Isn't it that the Master is operating a factory for these things to be produced ( $\$$ )? Apropos the same way that philosophy does. But the question is, where?

To answer such, it is inevitable to keep an eye on the University Discourse:

$$\frac{S_2}{S_1} \rightarrow \frac{a}{\$}$$

The University, above all others, produces divided subjects ( $\$$ ) that becomes Truth that speaks in behalf of Master Signifier in the Master Discourse. The knowledge ( $S_2$ ) that occupies the Agent position in the university discourse institutes a relation to the *objet petit a*, meaning, knowledge communicates with the object ( $a$ ) to be able to generate divided subjects ( $S_2 \rightarrow a$ ). In reality, the master signifier ( $S_1$ ) is really doing the operation in the University discourse via

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Thing that eludes language or combinative symbolization. It is also being characterized as something that is both present and absent. For a more detail account of this extimacy, see Jacques Alain-Miller, "Mathemes: Topology in the Teaching of Lacan," 32; and *Cours 1985-1986, Extimité* (May 14, 1986), unpublished. See also Pierre-Gilles Gueguen, "The Intimate, the Extimate and Psychoanalytic Discourse," in *Reflections*, 269-71: "for the extimate lies beyond *semblant*."

<sup>51</sup> Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 79.

occupation of  $S_1$  in the position of Truth ( $S_2/S_1$ ). Hence, University discourse is none other than the haven of “Modernized Masters.”

Be that as it may, the Master finds his origin from University. What we can find inside the University is nonetheless Master-in-the-making.

Mladen Dolar, a Slovenian expositor of Lacanian politics writes,

But the whole point of Lacan's construction of the university discourse is that this is another lure, that the seemingly autonomous and self-propelling knowledge has a secret clause, and that its truth is detained by the master under the bar.<sup>52</sup>

The university, for Dolar, is the lure of the master where the latter hides. We thought that the university operates in an autonomous structure, such that it implements curriculum, policies and regulations of its own, but as what Dolar wrote, the “master is under the bar.” Since the master hides under the representation of the university, it is on the latter’s premise that the former performs his operation of transforming the slave’s knowledge in to his own articulation. Furthermore, Dolar construe that Hegel was the epitome of the Master Discourse namely as the Philosopher of the State and at the same time Professor of the University. Universities are sanctuary of philosophers that caters the attitude of the Mastery in order to perform their function: to produce another Masters that will inherit the Mastery.

Hegel is both a persona of the Master Discourse or the University Discourse. Philosophy emerged when the Master disposed the knowledge of the Slave ( $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$ ) and this disposition is subject for continuity thru the University. Lacan tirelessly repeating this attitude throughout the seminar:

What Philosophy designate over its entire evolution? It’s this— theft, abduction, stealing slavery of its knowledge, through the maneuvers of the master...The entire function of the *episteme* in so far as it is specified as transmissible knowledge...is always borrowed from the techniques of craftsmen, that is to say of serfs. It

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<sup>52</sup> Dolar, *Hegel and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis*,

is a master of extracting the essence of this knowledge in order for it to become the master's knowledge.<sup>53</sup>

Henceforward, philosophy is the Mastery and philosophers are themselves Masters of their own doings.

### *The Problem of Philosophy*

So you have heard Lacan.

Philosophy is the operation of theft, abduction, stealing, slavery and other maneuvers that bereft the conscience of the other. Lacan found on Aristotle's politics the underpinning of slave's knowledge thus,

In Antiquity this was not simply a class, as with our modern slave, it was a function inscribed in the family. The slave Aristotle speaks of is just as much a part of the family as he is a part of the State, and even more a part of the family than a part of the State. This is because he is the one who has the know-how [*savoir-faire*].<sup>54</sup>

This *savoir-faire*, the know-how, is originally found in the slave and yet became transmissible to "master's pocket."<sup>55</sup> The slave is unconscious of this knowledge, but what he knows even better still is what the master wants, even if he is master of it, which is the usual case for otherwise he would not be a master. The Master uses this slave's knowledge in order to pursue the mode of production because he has the desire for knowledge in which he never possesses originally, something that is excluded, if not, included in the manner of temporal agreement through labor, wages and salaries in which the slave enjoys earning. By what way? Philosophy has something to do with it, says Lacan, in terms of transforming the know-how into an *episteme*, the purified knowledge?

What is *episteme* then? For Lacan,

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<sup>53</sup> Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 21-22; Dolar, "Hegel and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis," 138-9.

<sup>54</sup> Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 21.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, 22.

The entire function of the *episteme* insofar as it is specified as transmissible knowledge—see Plato’s Dialogues—is always borrowed from the techniques of the craftsmen, that is to say serfs. It is a matter of extracting the essence of this knowledge in order for it to become master’s knowledge.<sup>56</sup>

*Episteme* is the knowledge of the philosophers, of the masters to be exact. It is better expressed in “theoria”<sup>57</sup> in Aristotelian compendium, meaning, the theoretical knowledge, and the design in which the Master plots in order for the production to become possible. Lacan referred to *Meno* in saying that Socrates intervened as the Master in order to convert the know-how of the slave into a transmissible *episteme*, that is, the knowledge of the geometry.

It is obvious—“who can deny that philosophy has ever been anything other than a fascinating enterprise for the *master’s benefit*?”<sup>58</sup>

It is always a desire to know that leads to this very helm of theoretical knowledge. Desire what?—something that one cannot speak hence, it must be in silence.

### *The Desire to Know (the Loss)*

How to desire the Silent?

Philosophy already experiences this immediate loss via the passage of constituted anxiety toward an impossible object of satisfaction. Lacan used various terms to designate the character of the loss such as the Thing, (*Das Ding*), Truth and Entropy. The Thing, according to Lacan in his celebrated article that marked his return to Freud *The Freudian Thing or a Return to Freud*, is prosopoetic: “I, Truth, speak.”

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid 22

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 23

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

This “loss” in which one has to experience in order to put forward the desire is the origin of man’s wondrous narrative in philosophy. Hence, “to wonder” trace its origin from a certain loss. That is why in his *Metaphysics*, in order to find the archaic first principle, Aristotle opened his book *Metaphysics* with the line: “All men desire to know.” Desire what? The Thing. What kind? Impossibility. How impossible? It is metaphysical in nature. Out of nowhere.

Lacan showed that ‘wonder’ and ‘desire are elements of philosophy via the en route relation of Agent to Work ( $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$ ) in the discourse of the Master to which Lacan admitted in the same nature with philosophic discourse. The Agent to Work relation, that is  $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$ , is clearly an act of desiring the loss. The master/philosopher still believes that he holds knowledge but in reality, it is already a loss in his part for it is always-already a belonging of the slave ( $S_2$ ).

Since loss is constituted with desire, then knowledge is a mere impossibility that lingers to man’s satisfaction represented by *Jouissance* and *objet a*.

It is always a “desire to know.”

Desire—in a sense—that knowing shall answer the metaphysical questions of the subject more importantly on the expectancy of the knowledge as the final resolution. Yet, it is to desire that we desire and re-desire an impossibility which does not constitute the finality but otherwise a further anxiety hence, resulting to the re-invention or re-fantasy of the Thing as things (-in-particular) constituted as knowledge. This is what we call “knowledge-production.”

Then knowledge production was driven by re-invention of the Master rest assured that questions were thrown in his design with purpose of not liberating the oppressed but further cultivation of himself. Remember the upper chambers of the Master Discourse in which the Master Agent ( $S_1$ ) pertains to knowledge ( $S_2$ ) as his design so as to produce *objet petit a*, a known to be product which doesn’t exist in reality, meaning, a loss.

Knowledge-production is none other than Philosophy and Philosophy is nonetheless Mastery. Knowledge, truly says Lacan, is the sister of *Jouissance*: the relation of knowledge to the satisfaction one acquires.

Hence, Philosophy's *thaumazein*, "to wonder" is a desire to know (of a loss).

### *On Repetition of the Mastery*

Is philosophy still experiencing a symptom?

If one defines symptom, it is something that is problematic, that is, constituting too much anxiety in lieu of lacking something as a result of a loss. The Thing (*objet petit a*) was always already a loss since the beginning and yet we are confided to seek through fantasy so as to fulfill this very 'lack' temporarily. As what the famous Freud-Lacano dictum says, *Wo es war, soll Ich werden* (Where *it* was, there *I* come to be), the cogito follows the symptom, the very act of philosophizing to produce the actual fantasy the cogito longs for. Therefore, philosophy is a continuous process of fantasizing that produces not fulfillment in reality but something that is actually a loss, since the object of philosophizing has an impossible worth.

Fantasy has something to do with repeating the act. The product is a loss (knowledge of the unknown) which actually addressed in the Third Law of Thermodynamics as *Entropy*.<sup>59</sup> In every production there is an excess, a surplus in which one actually uses for another cycle, an entropic relation. This excess constitutes again the loss, the Thing that that we constantly desire and used all means to control.

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<sup>59</sup> Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 48, 50-51. For him, "Entropy is an imposition of a unary trait in which knowledge at work produces" (48). He further adds,

"This knowledge is a means of Jouissance. And, I repeat, when it is at work, what it produces is entropy. This entropy, this point of loss, is the sole point, the regular sole point at which we have access to the nature of Jouissance" (50-1).

This makes sense that for him, Entropy is the object-loss namely, *the objet petit a*, in which is the only access to Jouissance [cf. n. 35].

This excess is used by philosophers to transform nothing into being again: a process of re-affirming the dead by making “impossible” out of “impotence” (e.g. the belief that there is a philosopher’s stone): that the incapability of the philosopher in producing the Thing out of his desire to know is being employed in order to hide himself behind the shadows of his sign as the Master signifier. Another example is by postulating the existence of God, His death and eventually His divinity through the “second coming.”

This is exactly the repetition.<sup>60</sup> This is what Freud said as the impossibility in the complete verbalization of Truth. As a consequence, there is an endless compulsion to repeat, a never-ending attempt to verbalize the non-verbal. Repetition for Lacan is basically the *Jouissance* and *Jouissance* is entropy.<sup>61</sup>

As Kierkegaard puts it, “Repetition is a beloved wife which one never gets tired of.”<sup>62</sup>

Let us play a word-game. One can extract in the word “Repetition” the word “petition” which is synonymous to “affirmation” or thesis and by adding “re-” (repeat) we are reducing the meaning into “re-affirmation”. Affirmation, on the contrary, is nonetheless “negation” or in other words “anti-thesis.” Henceforth, thesis is opposite of anti-thesis, affirmation contrary to negation. If Philosophy has something in the attitude of repetition, then it has to be in the same light of negation, an external condition in which philosophy is already out of the control tower, out of regulative and dominative function in the reality.

Now, as one puts it, “Negation is the beloved wife of your neighbor.”

This loss should be negated, in order for one to do a non-repetition of knowledge and clearly to avoid the path that leads to nowhere.

This should be the path of the philosophic future. Not of the present that performs the plunder of slavery, the function of the Mastery.

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<sup>60</sup> Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 45-46, 48, 50.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>62</sup> Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling* trans. Alastair Hannay (Harmondsworth: Penguin Press, 1996).

## Postscript: Philosophizing from the Inside to the Outside

*What is present, if not a repetition of the past?*

Repetition in a sense that what happened in previous tradition is continually being done in the status quo, thusly, a bastardization of the supposed-to-be new attitude of philosophy in light of a new life that bears enjoyment. Perhaps, this is what philosophy ought to do base on its capability to adapt to a particular situation. For example, what universities ought to do if not to supply the demands of the world particularly the coping-world addressing its reflection to globalization.

Thence, it is a project for the future to expect the popularization of philosophy as pro-poor and the oppressed if and only if its present avoids the attitude of the past as theft, slavery, spoliation and so on as what postulated by Lacan in Seminar XVII.

The *episteme*, the supposed-to-be resolution to this buggery, was utilized by those in Master's thinking (philosophic) for a more productive object that will create mass hysterization and misleading fetishism of all. The philosophic present portrays a certain loss, and a repetitive attitude of the philosopher-master's spirit. Philosophy should acquire the contrary attitude. It should not be a "desire to know" but it should be on the negative, "dare to know."

What we need in order to revive the original attitude of philosophy (veered away from the theoretical standpoint of desiring and repetition) is a working of philosophy from the other side, which is, *philosophizing from the outside*.

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